An analysis of youth waived to Superior Court in North Carolina by Bohanan, Heather Elaine & NC DOCKS at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro
BOHANAN, HEATHER, ELAINE, M.A. An Analysis of Youth Waived to Superior 
Court in North Carolina. (2008) 
Directed by Dr. Saundra Westervelt.  74 pp. 
 
 
 
The purpose of this research is to examine youth aged 13 through 15 
eligible for waiver to Superior Court in North Carolina between 2005 and 2007 to 
determine if waivers vary by gender, race, and age when controlling for the legal 
variables of offense seriousness and prior record.  Using the population of all 
youth eligible for waiver during that period, I examine the relationship between 
each of the independent variables and waiver, and then again when controlling 
for each of the legal variables.  The results suggest that the most operative 
factors in determining waiver are the legal variables of offense seriousness and 
prior record, although a juvenile’s race and age also affect the likelihood of 
waiver.   
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Over the last century, the American public’s perception of juvenile crime 
and juvenile offenders has changed dramatically (Bishop and Frazier 1991; Feld 
1998; Kupcheck 2006).   A separate system of juvenile justice was developed 
after reformers recognized that children and adolescents are not fully capable of 
understanding their actions in the same manner as adults and therefore should 
not be held criminally responsible for those actions (Kupcheck 2006).  Initially, 
the juvenile system focused on the offender and his/her needs, rather than the 
offense and retributive penalties (Feld 1998; Jordan 2006; Kupcheck 2006; 
McCord, Widom, and Crowell, 2001).  Rehabilitation, not punishment, was the 
primary goal of the system in hopes that the juvenile could grow into a productive 
and positive adult member of society.   
During the 1980s and ‘90’s, an increase in juvenile crime brought the 
juvenile justice system under scrutiny.  Increases in violent crime committed by 
juveniles, fueled by media sensationalism, caused the public to demand 
increased penalties for youthful offenders, believing that juveniles were treated 
too leniently when committing violent “adult” crimes (Bishop and Frazier 1991; 
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Feld 1998; Feld, 2001; Jordan 2006; McCord, Widom, and Crowell, 2001).  
Phrases such as “adult crime, adult time” became popular in the media, and 
lawmakers responded to these demands.  In the 1990s, almost all states enacted 
laws making it easier to try youth in adult courts (Feld 2001; Urbana 2005). 
North Carolina is no exception in enacting new, more punitive sanctions 
for juvenile offenders.   According to state statute, juveniles age 16 and older are 
automatically transferred into criminal court if they are charged with committing a 
misdemeanor or felony.  Only three states - North Carolina, New York, and 
Connecticut - automatically waive youth at age 16, and of those three, North 
Carolina is the only one without reverse waiver, a process that allows a juvenile 
to petition for a return to juvenile court jurisdiction (The National Center for 
Juvenile Justice 2006).  In North Carolina, children as young as 13 may be 
transferred or waived into Superior Court if they meet certain statutory 
requirements, and must be transferred if probable cause exists to believe they 
have committed a Class A felony.  Prosecutors and juvenile court judges have 
considerable discretion in applying these requirements, a practice that in theory 
allows the justice system to consider an individual’s particular situation, but in 
reality may allow for discrimination against juveniles based on age, race, gender, 
or socio-economic characteristics.  Numerous studies have examined the 
practice of waiver to determine if older, male, minority youth are 
disproportionately waived given their overrepresentation among waived juveniles.  
Although these studies have yielded mixed results, some studies reveal little, if 
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any, effect of race and gender on the waiver process when accounting for a 
juvenile’s prior record and seriousness of the offense. This suggests that other 
factors, such as patterns of offending, may account for the overrepresentation of 
black males in the population of waived youth.  
Because waiver has serious detrimental consequences for the remainder 
of a juvenile’s life chances, it is important to continue to examine the potential 
impact of race and gender in the waiver process.  This is particularly true in a 
state such as North Carolina where youth as young as 13 may be sent to 
Superior Court, and, once waived, cannot be reverse waived back to the juvenile 
system for any future offenses.  This study will consider all children in North 
Carolina from 2005 to 2007 who were between the ages of 13 and 15 at the time 
of their alleged offense and were charged with a crime that, if committed by an 
adult, would have been considered a felony, with the exception of first degree 
murder.  This study examines: Do waivers to Superior Court vary by gender, 
race, age, offense seriousness, and past criminal history of the juvenile, and if 
so, which of these factors are more operative in the decision whether or not to 
transfer a case to Superior Court?  I hypothesize that although greater numbers 
of minority male juveniles are actually waived to Superior Court, race and gender 
do not affect the likelihood of waiver when controlling for current offense and past 
criminal history.  I also anticipate a positive correlation between age and waiver, 
with older youth being more likely to be waived.   
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 
HISTORY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 
 
 
 
Prior to the nineteenth century, children were not seen as significantly 
different from adults and were subject to the same penalties as adults for 
engaging in criminal acts.  Some consideration may have been given to an 
offender’s age, but no formalized process was in place to separate youthful 
offenders from adults in either the judicial or correctional phases of the legal 
system.  In the early 1800’s, this view of children began to change, partially due 
to widespread societal change during the Industrial Revolution.  Reform groups 
began examining overall social conditions with an emphasis on the welfare of 
children (Jordan 2006).  Previous beliefs that free will was the sole cause of 
criminal behavior also came into question during this time, and the idea that 
social environments could contribute to an individual’s decision to commit crimes 
began to be accepted (Jordan 2006).  The idea of adolescence emerged. 
“Youth,” while more developed than young children, were perceived as “future 
adults” who, despite engaging in criminal behavior, could be salvaged if 
corrective action was taken (Myers 2005).  Houses of Refuge and reform schools 
were opened, representing the first attempts to treat children differently from 
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adults (Myers 2005).  The Houses were based on the belief that providing 
delinquent youths a structured environment for rehabilitation would allow them to 
learn appropriate socialization skills and responsibility before returning to society.   
Although no formal waiver process was in place, such a system operated 
informally, as the children sent to Houses of Refuge were those who were seen 
as having the potential to reform and then return to society.  Children perceived 
as “unsalvageable” continued to be punished through adult courts and 
correctional facilities (Jordan 2006; Myers 2005; Singer 1996).   
Initially, Houses of Refuge were seen in a positive light, as institutions 
designed to raise children to be responsible members of society, instilling the 
correct values when their biological parents could not.  In this way, the state had 
adopted the role of parent, or “parens patriae,” which was upheld by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the 1839 case of Ex Parte Crouse where a child 
who had not committed a crime was committed to a House of Refuge due to the 
poverty of her parents.  In this case, the court viewed the intentions of the House 
of Refuge to help the child as a more positive step than returning the child to her 
parents (Jordan 2006; Myers 2005).  In a time when public education was 
beginning to be seen as an answer to urban disorder, the initial concept of the 
House of Refuge was an option for less seriously delinquent youth who held 
promise (Singer 1996).   
 Not long after their inception, however, Houses of Refuge were no longer 
seen as positive places instilling proper social values in children.   Over time, 
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they became state run organizations that could not be selective about the types 
of delinquents they accepted.  By having to house youth who had committed 
more serious crimes and who might otherwise have been sent to prisons, the 
Houses became more like prisons themselves with corporal punishment and 
manual labor as the main forms of rehabilitation (Myers 2005; Singer 1996).  The 
Houses had become institutions performing dual functions, serving as juvenile 
prisons at a time when no alternative placement for serious and violent juvenile 
offenders was available while maintaining their original purpose of education and 
reform for youth committing minor offenses.  By housing these two different 
juvenile populations together, Houses of Refuge moved away from their original 
mission of socialization and rehabilitation toward a more penal atmosphere and 
fell out of favor with reformers and lawmakers. 
 The Illinois Supreme Court demonstrated dissatisfaction with the condition 
of the Houses with its 1870 ruling in O’Connell v. Turner.  In direct opposition to 
the Crouse ruling of only thirty years earlier, the Illinois Court determined that the 
good intentions of the parent outweighed the poor actual performance of the 
House of Refuge.  Additionally, this court ruled the child had been denied the 
right of due process although the decision did not immediately result in the 
implementation of due process safeguards for juveniles (Jordan 2006; Meyers 
2005).   
Reformers continued to seek more appropriate ways to deal with 
delinquent juveniles, and in 1899 the Illinois Juvenile Court Act was passed, 
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establishing the first juvenile court in the United States.  The Act determined the 
age at which a juvenile was to be considered an adult and defined neglect, 
dependency, and delinquency.  It also established a separate court for youth with 
its own procedures that were different from those used in adult court.  
Additionally, it prevented children under age 12 from being detained in jails and 
required separation of incarcerated youth and adults.   
Other states followed Illinois, and by 1945 all states had established 
separate court systems for juvenile offenders (Jordan 2006; Meyers 2005).   
These newly established systems differed significantly from adult judicial and 
correctional systems by focusing on individual youth and his/her needs rather 
than the offense.  Since juvenile crimes were seen as symptomatic of a youth’s 
socialization needs, the seriousness of the crime did not affect the type or length 
of intervention the court imposed on the juvenile (Feld 1998), and retribution was 
not a consideration (Kupchick 2006).  Juvenile justice systems were designed to 
be flexible and individualistic, focusing on rehabilitation and supervision rather 
than punishment (Feld 1998).  Even the terminology of the court differed: 
juveniles committed delinquencies rather than crimes, and were adjudicated 
delinquent rather than found guilty.  
 Although separate juvenile justice systems were an improvement from the 
House of Refuge concept, they were not without flaws.  By the middle of the 
twentieth century, concerns mounted about the juvenile court systems.  Still 
founded on the idea of “parens patriae,” these courts had been given 
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considerable latitude in determining what type and length of treatment was best 
for particular youth.  Accusations surfaced that the courts did not have enough 
procedural safeguards and were denying juveniles their basic constitutional rights 
as well as discriminating against some.  The intention of juvenile rehabilitation 
was not at issue, rather the lack of guidelines for implementation was in question.  
The wide discretion characteristic of juvenile court resulted in juveniles being 
subjected to treatment that was not necessarily in their best interests.  Although 
no longer accomplished by sending juveniles to prison-like institutions, the 
juvenile system still provided a mechanism for upper and middle class segments 
of the population to control children of the lower classes relatively indiscriminately 
(Meyers 2005).  Several Supreme Court cases in the 1960s and 1970s provided 
mandates for juvenile courts, increasing protections for the rights of the youth 
who appeared before the court.  
 Kent v. the United States (1966) established the right of due process in 
waiver proceedings.  As a result of Kent, juveniles must have a hearing in order 
to be waived to adult court, and they have the right to an attorney during the 
hearing.  Judges must provide a written statement of the reasons justifying the 
transfer, and the youth’s attorney must be allowed access to all materials the 
judge considered when making the waiver decision (Jordan 2006). 
 Due process rights for juveniles were expanded by the Supreme Court in 
1967 with In re Gault.  The notion of “parens patriae” was rejected, as the court 
believed that Gault was being punished rather than helped by the juvenile court.  
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In cases where incarceration is a possible outcome, the court determined that 
juveniles have the right to counsel, to question witnesses, notice of charges, and 
protection against self-incrimination (Jordan 2006).   
 Two additional cases in the 1970s expanded the rights of juveniles.  In re 
Winship rejected the practice of using  “preponderance of evidence” as the 
burden of proof in juvenile cases.   “Reasonable doubt” was established as the 
standard of proof in all adjudicatory hearings (Jordan 2006).   Finally in Breed v. 
Jones, the Court ruled that if a youth is to be considered for transfer to adult 
court, the decision must be made before evidence is presented at the 
adjudicatory stage of juvenile court.  According to the Court, once evidence is 
presented at the adjudication hearing, jeopardy attaches, and to waive a youth to 
adult court after that time constitutes double jeopardy.  By attaching jeopardy to 
the adjudication hearing, the Court recognized that juvenile court proceedings 
were no longer social welfare proceedings, but rather criminal proceedings 
(Jordan 2006). 
 Despite recognizing juvenile court actions as criminal proceedings, the 
Supreme Court declined to bestow on juveniles all rights accorded to adult 
offenders.  In McKiever v. Pennsylvania, the Court rejected the idea that 
juveniles were entitled to a jury trial, and in Scahll v. Martin juveniles were denied 
the right to bail, making preventative detention allowable.  
 As responses to juvenile offenders moved from the initial focus on 
decriminalization of offenses toward a pattern of recriminalization, juveniles were 
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granted more procedural rights shared by adult offenders.  Theoretically, the 
primary objective of the juvenile system remained to rehabilitate juveniles 
whenever possible, returning them to society as positive, law abiding persons 
capable of avoiding further criminal activity as adults.  However, in the late 
twentieth century, the idea that certain juveniles could not be rehabilitated and 
returned to society began to emerge.  Juvenile court was perceived as too soft 
on offenders (Meyers 2005) who had a license to commit crimes with relative 
impunity until they were 18, resulting in chronic young offenders.  
 In response to the perception of increases in juvenile crime and the 
emergence of chronic and violent juvenile offenders, in the late 1970s and early 
1980s almost half of states passed laws regarding serious and chronic juvenile 
offenders.  These laws included lowering the age of waiver, mandating that 
certain crimes be tried in adult court, rather than juvenile court, and mandatory 
minimum sentencing guidelines (Jordan 2006; Kupcheck 2006; Meyers 2005).  
By the 1990s, almost all states had made some type of legislative change to 
address these juvenile offenders.  
 
Contemporary Juvenile Justice 
 In the mid 1980’s, the public and policymakers began to question the 
effectiveness of the juvenile justice system.   Arrest rates for juveniles surged in 
the mid 1980’s, and rates of juvenile homicide and other violent crimes increased 
more rapidly than those of similar adult crimes (Feld 1998).  In addition, the 
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average age of juvenile offenders decreased, while their use of handguns 
increased during this time period (Feld 1998).  Between 1985 and 1994, the 
arrest rate for violent crime committed by juveniles increased approximately 75%, 
the rate for murder more than doubling (Jordan 2006; Meyers 2005).  These 
trends, along with the increased use of guns, emerging crack cocaine industry, 
and development of an urban black underclass (Feld 2001) led to a focus on 
young black offenders who dominated the crack cocaine trade of the 1980s.  
Stories about young black men involved with gangs and drugs while committing 
violent crimes with the use of a handgun became popular in the media who 
portrayed adolescents as the major crime threat in the United States (Krisberg 
1994).  These “highly visible, serious, and violent offenses” fueled fears of middle 
class white America and caused public outrage that these individuals would be 
charged as juveniles when they were perceived as “mature and sophisticated 
offenders”  (Feld 1998) who were fully cognizant of the seriousness of their 
actions.  Many of these juveniles had histories with the juvenile justice system 
and continued to break the law, increasing the pressure to treat repeat offenders 
differently, as rehabilitative efforts clearly had not been successful.   
The juvenile justice system was perceived to be incapable of responding 
appropriately to these new types of violent offenders (Krisberg, 1994; Meyers 
2005).  Lawmakers found it difficult to support continued rehabilitative efforts for 
previously unresponsive juveniles, as well as for those first offenders who 
committed serious violent crime (Bishop & Frazier 1991).  Juvenile offenders 
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committing violent, serious, and repeat offenses, particularly when linked to gang 
or drug activity, were thought to be extremely dangerous and became known as 
“super-predators” (Jordan 2006).  The public feared these offenders and believed 
that the heinous nature of many juvenile crimes demonstrated adult motivations 
and comprehension, and therefore offenders should receive their “just desserts” 
(Jordan 2006).  The concepts of personal responsibility and accountability, 
formerly reserved for adult offenders, began to garner widespread support for 
juvenile offenders as well. The phrase “adult crime, adult time” became popular 
in the media and as an expression of public opinion.   
As society began to demand more accountability for the actions of this 
new kind of youthful offender, the focus of juvenile justice shifted away from 
rehabilitation and the individual circumstances of the offender and towards the 
goals of accountability and punishment, more typically aligned with the criminal 
justice system.  Juvenile justice began to place more emphasis on the 
seriousness of the current offense as well as a youth’s prior record (Feld 1998).  
Surveys from the early 1990’s showed a majority of adults in favor of violent 
youth being tried in adult courts (Meyers 2005).  Lawmakers responded to public 
pressure by passing laws mandating certain types of youth to be tried as adults 
and providing prosecutors and judges discretionary mechanisms of prosecuting 
juveniles as adults, thereby assuaging the public’s outrage and demand for 
accountability while still protecting the intent of the juvenile justice system for less 
serious offenders.  
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Types of Waivers 
 The process of transferring an adolescent from juvenile to adult court is 
referred to as a waiver and generally occurs in one of four scenarios.  First, a 
juvenile may be waived to adult court as a result of statute requiring transfer due 
to the offense or age of the youth at the time of the offense.  If transfer is not 
legislatively mandated, a juvenile also may be waived when the prosecutor or the 
court believes that the juvenile system will not be able to respond to the juvenile 
and his offense in an appropriate manner.  In the second scenario, the potential 
sanctions available to juvenile court may not be deemed adequate to address the 
severity of the offense committed.  In the third situation, the juvenile may have an 
extensive prior record demonstrating no positive outcomes from past encounters 
with the juvenile system; and in the final circumstance, the juvenile may be close 
to the maximum age of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, therefore providing an 
inadequate amount of time for the juvenile system to work with the offender.   
Three types of waivers are available: judicial, prosecutorial, and legislative 
waiver.  Each type of waiver considers different combinations of factors regarding 
the juvenile and the offense when making the decision to transfer.  In addition, 
many states automatically transfer any youth who has a prior conviction in 
criminal court.  Most jurisdictions use some combination of types of waiver.   
Judicial Waiver 
 The most widely used method to transfer a juvenile to adult court is the 
judicial waiver.  Some form of judicial waiver has been a part of juvenile justice 
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since the Houses of Refuge era.  A judicial waiver leaves the decision to shift the 
offender to adult court entirely in the hands of the juvenile court judge who 
considers case specific features of the juvenile and the offense.  Typically, the 
judge seeks to determine two factors regarding the juvenile, his/her amenability 
to treatment and his/her perceived dangerousness to society.  Age is only 
considered as it plays into the amount of time the juvenile will have available to 
complete treatment.   
Prosecutorial Waiver 
 Similar to judicial waiver in its discretionary aspect is the prosecutorial 
wavier.  This method allows the prosecutor rather than the juvenile court judge to 
make the decision regarding which court will try the youth.  Prosecutors are 
typically less concerned with the juvenile’s amenability to treatment than with 
determining the appropriate type of retribution (Bishop & Frazier, 2001).  
Because prosecutors’ focus is primarily on the crime and adequate punishment, 
rather than the offender and appropriate treatment, prosecutors typically focus on 
the type of crime committed, previous record, and age of the offender (to ensure 
the youth will not age out of the juvenile system before being adequately 
punished).  In addition, since prosecutors are elected officials, they may be more 
responsive to public pressure than the needs of the particular offender (Feld 
1998).  
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Legislative Waiver 
 Under legislative waiver, also known as statutory exclusion, lawmakers 
establish legal guidelines that determine when a juvenile will be transferred to 
adult court.  These laws exclude certain juveniles from the jurisdiction of the 
juvenile court, automatically transferring them to adult court.  Typically, laws set 
certain age limits combined with types of crimes and aggravating factors.  For 
example, all persons 15 or older who commit murder, or persons 16 and older 
who commit a crime against a person with the aggravating factor of using a 
firearm, may be mandated to transfer to criminal court.  These laws typically 
address only serious offenses, repeat offenders, or a combination of the two 
since by trying the youth in adult court the focus will be on punishment, not 
rehabilitation.  Statutory exclusion seeks to establish universal guidelines 
regarding which types of juveniles will be waived, addressing claims that other 
types of waiver allow too much discretion on the part of judges and prosecutors.  
However, since prosecutors determine the charges against particular youth, 
legislative mandate does not counteract as much discretionary decision-making 
as it may appear (Feld 1998; Kupchik 2006). 
Once an Adult, Always an Adult 
 In addition to the three types of waiver, thirty-one states have a provision 
that allows the justice system to automatically shift a youth into the criminal court 
(Jordan 2006).  If a juvenile was previously waived and convicted in adult court, 
all future prosecutions will be conducted in adult court, regardless of any other 
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mitigating factors of the offense.  Most of the states that employ this provision 
require a conviction in criminal court for subsequent transfers to occur.  Three of 
these states require that the conviction be a felony conviction.  However, a few 
states do not require a conviction at all, using the rationale that if the juvenile was 
previously deemed inappropriate for treatment by the juvenile court, he would still 
be inappropriate at a later time, and therefore automatically waived for any 
offense.  
Reverse Waiver/Decertification 
 Some states allow a juvenile who has previously appeared in criminal 
court to have subsequent court hearings be reverse waived back to juvenile 
court.  The decertification hearing is typically conducted by the criminal court 
judge who has initial jurisdiction over the youth.  Reverse waiver hearings are 
guided by similar principles as waiver hearings and seek to determine which 
justice system can most appropriately serve a particular juvenile.  
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
Waiving a youth to adult court has a serious impact on the future life 
chances of that juvenile.  Youth who remain in the juvenile system are 
guaranteed a degree of confidentiality, cannot be incarcerated in adult facilities 
while awaiting trial, and if found guilty, may only be kept in custody until the 
maximum age of juvenile jurisdiction.  They are less likely to suffer the social and 
legal stigmas attached to a convicted criminal once attaining adulthood (Bishop & 
Frazier 1991).  Theoretically, waiver should be a last resort and implemented 
only for those youth who cannot benefit from the rehabilitative nature of the 
juvenile court system.  However, due to media sensationalism, changing patterns 
of offending, public perception, and public policy officials’ desires to appear tough 
on crime, large numbers of youth began to be waived in the 1980s as the focus 
on juvenile crime began to move further toward criminalization and retribution 
and farther from rehabilitation, in spite of detrimental effects on individual youth.  
During the1980s, the practice of waving youth increased by over 400 percent 
(Steiner 2005).    
The practice of transferring such a large number of youth with no apparent 
effect on deterrence or public safety (Urbina 2005) has prompted questions
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regarding waiver on many grounds.  Various studies have examined patterns in 
the types of youth who are waived to adult court.  Prior record, age, and offense 
seriousness are the strongest predictors of transfer (Barnes & Farnz 1989; 
Clement 1997; Fagan and Deschenes 1990; Houghtalin and Mays 1991; Jordan 
2006; Kinder et al.; Meyers 2001; Podkopacz and Feld 1996).  Although the 
majority of waived youth are minority males, studies employing multivariate 
analysis have not consistently found evidence of a race or gender effect in 
transfer decisions (Barnes and Franz 1989; Fagan 1990; Jordan 2006; Kinder et 
al. 1995; Podkopacz and Feld 1996; Poulos and Orchowsky 1994).   
 
Factors Affecting Waiver - Offense Seriousness, Prior Record, and Age 
 Studies reveal that the likelihood of waiver increases for juveniles charged 
with more serious offenses who have prior records and are older (and, thus, 
closer to aging out of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction).  In a study of waived youth 
in Florida, the majority of youth were 16 or 17 years old and charged with 
burglary or some form of robbery (Thomas and Bilchik 1985).  In addition, 
approximately 60% had a prior record, possibly indicating that they were 
previously non-responsive to the rehabilitative efforts of juvenile court.  Bishop 
and Frazier (1991) also examined waived youth in Florida and found that the 
majority of juveniles waived were 17 years old and 84% of youth were charged 
with violent or property felonies.  A study examining Texas youth found that 76% 
of those waived were charged with a violent offense (Fritsch, Caeti, and 
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Hemmens, 1996).  Houghtalin and Mays (1991) also found older youth to be 
more likely to be transferred, with juveniles 17 years old accounting for 60% of 
transfers, and 16 year olds accounting for another 30%.  The majority of the 
youth had at least one prior offense and were charged with a serious crime as 
measured by the Uniform Crime Report (Part I Index offenses, violent personal or 
property crimes, or Part II person offenses).  A more recent study of Virginia 
youth found 81% of transfers were 17 years old, and an additional 18% were 16 
(Clemment 1997).  All youth waived had some type of prior criminal record.  
 While the previously mentioned studies do provide valuable information 
concerning the population of waived offenders, they are limited in that they only 
included juveniles who already have been waived.  Without a comparison group, 
it is not possible to conclude which factors are most operative in the decision to 
waive youth.  To improve on the limitations of this research, numerous 
comparative studies have been conducted.  These studies reinforce the finding 
noted above that seriousness of offense, prior record, and age are statistically 
significant in the decision to transfer youth to criminal court. 
 One such study compared violent youth who had transfer petitions filed 
with those who did not (Fagan 1990).  The results of the study indicated that the 
seriousness of the offense and the age of the juvenile were significant when 
predicting if a transfer petition would be filed.  Older youth charged with more 
serious offenses, particularly murder, were more likely to receive a waiver 
petition.  This study did not find a juvenile’s prior record significant; however, age 
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at onset of delinquency was used in the model, which dismissed the strength of 
the relationship between prior record and transfer.   
 Barnes and Franz (1989) examined juveniles eligible for waiver in 
California and also found that the more serious the offense, the more likely a 
youth would be waived.  In addition, their study showed a relationship between 
previous offenses and waiver, with youth having more extensive records being 
more likely to be transferred.  In this particular study, age was not found to be 
significantly associated with the likelihood of waiver.  Although older youth were 
more likely to be waived, the relationship was not statistically significant.  
However, the lack of statistical significance may have been affected by the small 
sample size.  
 In a study of youth in Missouri, Kinder et al. 1995 did find the age of a 
juvenile to have a positive effect on his/her chance of being waived.  Nearly 74% 
of the transferred youth were 16 or 17, whereas 70% of the youth who were 
retained in the juvenile system were 14 or 15.  Juveniles who were charged with 
a violent crime also had an increased chance of being waived.  
 Poulos and Orchowsky (1994) conducted a study comparing all youth 
eligible for waiver in Virginia.  The juvenile’s prior record was significant, with 
those having more previous offenses being more likely to be transferred.  The 
single strongest predictor of wavier was the number of prior felony property 
offenses, followed by prior felony offenses against persons.   In addition, older 
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youth faced an increased probability of waiver.   Juveniles who used a firearm 
were more likely to be transferred than those who did not.  
 Other studies also have shown the use of a weapon to increase the 
chance of waiver. (Podkopacz and Feld 1996).  Although they did not find that 
offense seriousness affected the chances of waiver, as felony person and 
property offenses were not waived differently, the use of a weapon significantly 
increased the probability of a youth’s being waived.  This study also found age to 
be a strong predictor, with older juveniles more likely to be waived, as well as 
those with four or more previous offenses.    
 
The Effects of Race and Gender – Inconsistent Findings 
 The literature is inconsistent in determining if race and gender play 
significant roles in determining which youth are waived.  Purely descriptive 
studies that only examine youth who already have been waived consistently 
show an overrepresentation of minority males.  Thomas and Bilchik (1985) found 
68% of the youth in their study were minority group members and nearly 95% 
were male.  Other studies (Clement 1997) have found almost all waived juveniles 
to be African-American (96.8%) males (98.9%).    
 Unlike descriptive studies which give the appearance of a race/gender 
effect, research that controls for offense seriousness, previous record, and age, 
has most often found no statistically significant effect of race on waiver decisions.  
Although a greater percentage of minority youth were waived, Fagan and 
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Deschenes (1990) did not find race to be statistically significant when controlling 
for legal variables (offense seriousness and previous record) and age.  
Podkopacz and Feld (1996) had similar findings in that, although more minority 
youth were waived, after controlling for age and legal variables, the race effect 
was not significant.  
 Not all studies that controlled for legal variables found that race effects 
were eliminated.  Barnes and Franz (1989) determined that even after including 
information on current offense and prior record, race was still a significant 
predictor of transfer.  However, the effect of race was not as strong as that of 
seriousness of the current offense or an individual’s prior record.   
 Fewer studies have focused specifically on gender as a significant 
predictor of transfer, possibly due to the consistently small numbers of females 
eligible for waiver.  However researchers have examined gender to determine if 
outcomes within the juvenile system vary by gender, and if so, if the variations 
are significant.  Peterson (1988) found that being female had a statistically 
significant effect on outcomes within the juvenile justice system, with females 
receiving increased leniency at all stages of the system.  Tittle and Curran (1998) 
also found an inverse relationship between females and sentencing severity, with 
the exception of status offenses where the effect was no longer statistically 
significant.  Other studies have found no difference in the treatment of males and 
females at any stage in the juvenile system (Dannfer and Schutt 1982; McCarthy 
and Smith 1986). 
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  Both descriptive and comparative studies show that the majority of waived 
youth are African-American males; however, the prevalence of this demographic 
in the population does not in and of itself demonstrate that these two factors 
influence waiver, and the body of research is inconclusive.  Why then do minority 
male youth, particularly African American male youth, account for the majority of 
waived juveniles? It is difficult to determine a conclusive answer, particularly 
when only studying one outcome of the juvenile justice system, such as waiver.  
 
Continuum of Juvenile Justice 
A waiver decision is the end of the line in the continuum of the juvenile 
justice system that may begin with a call to police.  Decisions throughout the 
legal process affect which juveniles are eventually eligible for waiver.  Bias may 
operate at any point throughout the legal system, beginning with the response of 
the police when called to the scene of the crime.  National data indicate that 
African American juveniles are arrested and charged with different types of 
crimes than white juveniles (Podkopacz and Feld 1995).  With the increase in 
gun-related youth homicides, arrests of African American youth increased 
sharply.  During a seven-year period beginning in 1986, arrest rates for African 
American juveniles increased 278% while that of white youth increased only 40% 
(Sickmund, Snyder, and Poe-Yamagata 1997).  Although self-reports of 
offending show a higher offense rate by blacks, this difference is significantly less 
than the discrepancy in arrest rates (McCord, Wisom, and Crowell, 2001). By 
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choosing to arrest certain youth and not others, the police make the initial 
determination of which juveniles will eventually be subject to waiver decisions.  
Because police may focus their attention on lower class, minority neighborhoods, 
minority youth may be more likely to be arrested and therefore possess a more 
extensive juvenile record beginning at an earlier age than juveniles from 
predominately white middle and upper class neighborhoods (Jordan 2005).  
Prosecutors also influence the sample of youth included in studies as 
eligible for transfer by determining what charge to levy against a particular youth.  
By choosing to file a less serious charge against certain types of youth, 
prosecutors can ensure that some youth are treated as juveniles throughout the 
justice process and are never candidates for waiver.  Judges only have the 
option to waive eligible cases presented to them, and by choosing to charge a 
youth with a misdemeanor, a prosecutor may remove the option of waiver for that 
youth (Podkopacz and Feld 1996).  Each stage in the legal process provides an 
opportunity for discretionary decisions to affect whether or not a particular youth 
ultimately will be in a position to be considered for waiver.  It is difficult to capture 
the cumulative results of the numerous discretionary decisions made throughout 
the juvenile justice process.  Through the life of a particular juvenile, many small 
decisions are made where race (or gender) is not a statistically significant factor; 
however, when these changes are amplified throughout the entire system, the 
end result may be racially impacted (or impacted by gender) (Feld 1988).   
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Bishop and Frazier’s (1996) investigation of juvenile cases in Florida from 
the point of referral to the juvenile justice system through the final outcome 
reveals how decisions made throughout the process can result in discriminatory 
outcomes.  They found that numerous well-intended agency policies were 
inadvertently discriminatory and resulted in more minority and economically 
disadvantaged youth experiencing the full continuum of the juvenile justice 
system.  For example, parental involvement and perceived parental buy-in are 
requirements for youth to participate in diversion programs.  While on the surface 
this is logical since a youth’s chances of success in a diversionary program are 
increased with parental involvement and support, many minority and working 
class parents may be single, working multiple jobs, or lack transportation to 
meetings with juvenile justice staff.  Barriers to parental involvement may be 
misconstrued as parental disinterest by those recommending diversionary 
programs, and therefore minority and lower class youth will continue through the 
formal juvenile justice process (Bishop and Frazier 1996).  Although this study 
did not examine waiver decisions per se, it provides a framework for 
understanding how minority and economically disadvantaged youth eventually 
makeup a significant portion of the youth available for waiver.  
Just as multiple discretionary decisions prior to the waiver stage in juvenile 
justice processing affect the racial composition of youth available for waiver, so 
do these decisions have a similar impact on the gender of youth facing waiver.  
Between 1981 and 1994, the arrest rate for females committing violent crime 
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increased by 120% (McCord, Widom, and Crowell, 2001).  Bishop and Frazier 
(1992) conducted a study to examine the cumulative impact of discretionary 
decisions on female juveniles.  They did not look at waiver decisions, but rather 
the steps prior to waiver to determine if females were equally likely to be 
recommended for prosecution.  They found that not only were police less likely to 
arrest females for person or property crimes, but also once arrested for criminal 
offenses (as opposed to status offenses), male youth are significantly more likely 
to be formally charged than females.  Consistent with other studies, older, 
African-American juveniles also had an increased probability of being formally 
charged in the juvenile system.  Of these three variables, Bishop and Frazier 
found that gender was the most significant variable affecting the decision to 
formally charge youth – approximately one and a half times the effect of being 
black, and approximately an equal effect of a two-year increment in age (as older 
youth have an increased chance of being waived).  Although this study did not 
directly examine possible gender bias in waiver decisions, it is consistent with 
Podkopacz and Feld’s conclusions that although greater numbers of certain 
types of youth are actually waived, it cannot necessarily be attributed to 
discrimination during waiver decisions and may be a result of decisions made 
throughout the criminal justice system before a youth reaches the point of a 
waiver hearing. 
These studies reveal that the impact of race and gender on waiver 
decisions is often difficult to isolate given the interaction of these factors with 
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other variables such as patterns of offending, victim characteristics, and multiple 
discretionary decisions made throughout the juvenile justice process.  Due to the 
inconsistency of these findings, it is important to continue to investigate the 
potential impact of race and gender, in addition to offense severity, prior record, 
and age, on waiver decisions.  
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
Social control theory proposes that individuals are socialized to adhere to 
the generally accepted norms and beliefs of society (Shoemaker, 2000).  
According to Donald Black, social control is “the normative aspect of social life, or 
the definition of deviant behavior and the response to it” (Black 1976, p.12).  The 
majority of people conform to societal norms without threat of formal sanctions. 
However, some acts of deviance are met with formal legal sanctions.  Laws 
provide the guidelines for formal sanctions, and the criminal justice system 
determines which members of society are subject to these sanctions and to what 
degree.   
The application of law cannot be separated from the society within which it 
operates.  In addition to legal characteristics, every case also has social 
characteristics, which vary according to the individuals involved.  The social 
characteristics of the victim, defendant and any other players constitute the social 
structure of the case which affects each legal decision made throughout the life 
of that case (Black 1989).  Unlike a jurisprudential model of law, which regards 
law as a logical process applied universally to all legally similar cases in 
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an identical manner, a sociological model of law assumes that law is variable, 
changing based on the social characteristics of the parties involved in each 
particular case (Black 1989).  The jurisprudential model is used to examine how 
cases should be decided whereas the sociological model is used to examine how 
cases are actually decided (Black 1989).   
If decisions to waive juveniles were based purely on legal variables, such 
as the seriousness of the current offense and a juveniles’ previous criminal 
record, studies that control for these legal variables should consistently find no 
effects of a youth’s race, gender, or age on the probability of being waived.  
However, the research is not consistent, with some studies finding significant 
effects of race, gender, and age at the point of waiver.  In addition, all descriptive 
studies demonstrate that the population of waived youth is overwhelmingly 
African-American and male.  One possible explanation of the disproportionate 
number of minority males experiencing waiver can be found in social control 
theory.  
 Donald Black’s theory of social control is applicable to the application of 
law by the criminal justice system without regard to the psychology of individuals.  
Black argues that law is governmental social control and can be represented as a 
quantitative variable (Black 1976).  Law increases and decreases, depending on 
the setting and the persons involved in a particular situation.  For example, the 
social control imposed by law increases when social control imposed by the 
family decreases.  Therefore, a deviant juvenile in a single parent home who is 
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potentially subject to less familial social control  may be more likely to become 
involved with the criminal justice system than a comparably deviant juvenile with 
two parents in the home (Black 1976).   
Black’s theory may be used to examine outcomes in the juvenile justice 
system.  When a juvenile is discovered to have committed a deviant act, many 
actions can be taken against that juvenile.  These actions can be placed on a 
continuum, ranging from the lowest quantity of law to the highest.  Law 
enforcement may not become involved, and the juvenile’s parents may work out 
restitution with the victim.  If law enforcement is summoned, the juvenile begins 
interaction with the formal legal system.  The quantity of law imposed on the 
juvenile increases with each phase through the system from an official citation, to 
criminal charges leading to probation, to diversion into some type of therapeutic 
day camp, to placement in a juvenile detention center, to waiver to Superior 
Court to face adult criminal charges.  Other specific outcomes are possible at 
various locations on the continuum; however, the highest quantity of law that may 
be imposed on a juvenile is to transfer him/her to Superior Court where he/she 
will be tried and sentenced as an adult.  As long as the youth remains in the 
juvenile system, he/she will be subject to a more therapeutic style of law, but 
once waived will be subjected to the penal style of law characteristic of adult 
corrections. 
Although this study does not seek to test Black’s theory, his theory 
provides a useful framework for examining the forces of social control guiding the 
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actions of the juvenile justice system.  Black’s theory provides a lens through 
which to understand how age, gender, and race, as components of the social 
characteristics of waiver cases, may impact waiver decisions, even when 
controlling for legal variables.  
 
CHAPTER V 
 
METHODS 
 
 
 
 The literature regarding waiver is inconsistent in determining a significant 
relationship between race and gender and waiver decisions.  In every study cited 
in this study, the majority of transferred youth were minority males.  Because of 
the large numbers of minority male youth transferred, and the irreversible effects 
of waiver decisions on the remainder of a juvenile’s life, it is important to continue 
to examine the role of race and gender in waiver decisions.   
 In North Carolina, statutes allow for youth to be transferred to Superior 
Court as young as 13 years old.  Once transferred, juveniles are treated as 
adults in all future criminal proceedings. This study describes youth in North 
Carolina who were eligible for transfer between 2005 and 2007.  It will reveal if 
waivers to Superior Court vary by age, race, gender, offense seriousness, and 
past criminal history of the juvenile, and, if so, which of these factors are more 
operative than others in the decision to transfer a case to Superior Court.   
 
North Carolina Statutes 
 North Carolina law allows for the use of all three types of waiver and is 
one of the thirty-one states with the “once an adult, always an adult” provision.  
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North Carolina statute defines a juvenile as “a person who has not reached the 
person's eighteenth birthday and is not married, emancipated, or a member of 
the armed forces of the United States (G.S. 7B-101).”   Delinquent juveniles are 
defined as any juvenile “less than 16 … but at least 6 years of age (who) 
commits a crime or infraction (7B-1501 7).”  North Carolina statutes mandate that 
persons sixteen and older who commit any crime will be subject to prosecution 
as an adult.   
In addition to legislative mandates automatically transferring youth over 
the age of sixteen to criminal court, Statute 7B-2200 includes provisions for 
judicial and prosecutorial waiver.  The prosecutor, the juvenile’s attorney1, or the 
judge may motion to transfer a youth age thirteen or older to criminal court if the 
alleged offense was one which would have been a felony if committed by an 
adult (7B-2200).  If the alleged offense is a Class A felony2, and a finding of 
probable cause exists, the case automatically will be transferred to Superior 
Court and the juvenile tried as an adult.  If probable cause is found and transfer 
                                                 
1 According to North Carolina Statute 7B-2000, any juvenile alleged to be within the jurisdiction of 
the court has the right to be represented by counsel in all proceedings. All juveniles shall be 
presumed to be indigent, and counsel shall be appointed for them unless they retain their own 
counsel.  
2 Currently, North Carolina statute includes only two crimes that constitute a Class A felony. 
Statute 14-17 defines homicide meeting the definition of a Class A felony as “A murder which 
shall be perpetrated by means of a nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon of mass destruction 
as defined in G.S. 14-288.21, poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, torture, or by any 
other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the 
perpetration or attempted perpetration of any arson, rape or a sex offense, robbery, kidnapping, 
burglary, or other felony committed or attempted with the use of a deadly weapon shall be 
deemed to be murder in the first degree, a Class A felony.” Statute14-288-22 defines the 
remaining Class A felony as the willful injury of another by the use of a nuclear, biological, or 
chemical weapon of mass destruction. 
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is not required because the offense is not a Class A felony, the juvenile court will 
hold a transfer hearing where the court will determine if the needs of the juvenile 
and the protection of the public are best served by transferring the juvenile to 
Superior Court (7B-2202e).  Legislation requires the following eight factors to be 
considered when making a waiver determination: the juvenile’s age; maturity; 
intellectual functioning; prior record; prior attempts at rehabilitation; programs and 
facilities available to the court to rehabilitate the juvenile in the amount of time 
remaining in the Juvenile Court’s jurisdiction3 and the likelihood that the juvenile 
will benefit from such treatment or rehabilitation programs; whether the offense 
was committed “in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner;” the 
severity of the offense and if public protection requires prosecution of the juvenile 
as an adult (7B-2203).  Once a juvenile has been transferred to and convicted in 
Superior Court, any subsequent criminal proceedings will automatically be held in 
Superior Court (7B –1604).  In other words, once an individual is convicted as an 
adult, he/she will automatically be treated as an adult in any future criminal 
proceeding, regardless of age or other circumstances of the alleged offense.  
North Carolina does not include a provision for reverse waiver or decertification; 
                                                 
3 According to North Carolina Statute, the age at which the Juvenile Court’s jurisdiction over a 
youth expires is dependent on the crime for which the youth was convicted. According to Statute 
7B-2513, if the juvenile is convicted of an offense that would have been first degree murder 
(pursuant to G.S. 14-17), first degree rape (pursuant to G.S. 14-27.2), or first degree sexual 
offense (pursuant to G.S. 14-27.4) if committed by an adult, that age is twenty-one.  If the juvenile 
is convicted of a crime that would be considered a Class B1, B2, C, D, or E felony if committed by 
an adult (other than first degree rape or sexual assault), the maximum age of jurisdiction for the 
Juvenile Court is nineteen. For all other offenses, the maximum age is eighteen.  Since first 
degree murder is a Class A felony, the juveniles considered in this paper (age thirteen to fifteen) 
would be automatically transferred to Superior Court if they were alleged to have committed first 
degree murder and therefore those juveniles are not considered in the study.  
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therefore, once a juvenile is waived and convicted as an adult, all future criminal 
proceedings will be held in Superior Court. 
 
Present Research   
The Population 
 Data for this research project are taken from records provided by the 
North Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
(NCDJJDP).  Staff at DJJDP provided information on all juveniles eligible for 
waiver to Superior Court in the state of North Carolina between 2005 and 2007.  
The Department changed its data collection database in 2004 which is why 2005 
is the starting point for this study.  Based on NC Statutes, this population 
includes juveniles aged 13 to 15 at the time of the eligible offense who were 
charged with a crime that, if committed by an adult, would have been a felony. 
This excludes juveniles charged with Class A felonies, which are automatically 
waived.  This dataset represents the complete population of juveniles eligible for 
waiver from 2005 to 2007. 
 The researcher completed the NCDJJDP’s Research Request form as 
well as the agency’s Pledge of Researcher’s Confidentiality and Ethical Behavior 
protocol.  After receiving and reviewing these requests, NCDJJDP provided the 
information to the researcher in the form of a deidentified data set.  At no time 
was the researcher aware of the names or any other unique identifiers (such as 
social security numbers) of any of the juvenile offenders in the dataset.  Due to 
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the fact that the data were deidentified at the time of receipt, this project was able 
to receive an expedited approval from the UNCG Institutional Review Board.  
Several records were eliminated from the original dataset.  Deleted 
records include cases in which one of four dispositions occurred: 1) the charge 
was dismissed,  2) the juvenile had multiple charges and was waived for some 
charges, but remained under the jurisdiction of juvenile court for others, 3) the 
juvenile was automatically transferred to adult court for first degree murder, and 
4) the juvenile was automatically transferred to adult court because once a 
juvenile has been transferred, all future offenses are automatically tried in 
Superior Court.  The remaining dataset includes 1550 offenses committed by 
1108 juveniles.  
 Independent Variables  
 Based on the data available, this study examines demographics of the 
offender, offense seriousness, and past criminal history.  Ideally, this study would 
include information about the victim; however, that information is not captured in 
the NCDJJP database.  Incorporating victim information into the analysis would 
require a much more in-depth examination of actual case records of the juveniles 
included in the population.  Due to time constraints of this project and the level of 
approval to access identifiable juvenile criminal records, obtaining victim 
information is not practical.   
a. Demographics of the Offender 
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 Demographic characteristics available from NCDJJDP include the 
juveniles’ gender, race, and age at the time of the eligible offense.  Gender is 
coded as female and male.  Race was determined by the NCDJJDP staff during 
intake.  Race is coded as black, white, and other youth of color4.  Age is coded in 
year intervals (13,14 and 15).  These demographics are presented in Table 1.  
 
 
Table 1 – Demographics of Youth Eligible for Waiver 
 
N = 1108 
Male 1007  (90.9%) Gender 
Female 101    (9.1%) 
 
Black 709  (64.0%) 
White 309  (27.9%) 
Race 
Other Youth of Color 90    (8.1%) 
 
13 222  (20.0%) 
14 337  (30.4%) 
Age 
15 549  (49.6%) 
 
 
 
b. Seriousness of Offense (Current Offense Type) 
 The seriousness of a juvenile’s offense is measured by the variable 
“current offense type,” which is divided into two broad categories – crimes 
against persons and non-person crimes.  Crimes against persons (such as 
kidnapping, robbery, and rape) are divided into “multiple person offenses,” which 
includes juveniles charged with two or more person crimes simultaneously, and 
                                                 
4 This category includes Asian (5), Latino (55), Multi-racial (14), Native American (15) and 
Unknown (1) youth. These categories are collapsed into “other youth of color” due to the small 
numbers of each of the above racial classifications. 
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“single person offenses,” which captures juveniles charged with only one person 
crime.  Crimes against persons  are deemed more serious than non-person 
crimes, which include property crimes and crimes against the state (such as 
arson and the manufacture or sale of illegal drugs).  “Multiple person offenses” 
are considered the most serious, followed by “single person offenses” and then 
“property crimes/crimes against the state.”  Drug crimes are classified as 
property crimes/crimes against the state because they do not have a victim in the 
same sense as a crime against a person.  The individual choosing to purchase 
illicit drugs is a voluntary participant in the crime, unlike a robbery victim who 
does not request to be robbed.   
No juveniles in this population were charged with multiple property 
crimes/crimes against the state.  Neither were any juveniles charged with a 
person offense and a property crime/crime against the state simultaneously.  All 
crimes are felonies, because only by committing a felony is a youth eligible for 
waiver.  The categories are determined as the most satisfactory way to combine 
similar types of offenses which is necessary due to the relatively small data set.  
The category of “multiple person offenses” includes juveniles simultaneously 
charged with between two and eleven person offenses.  For a listing of the 
specific charged offenses in each category, see Appendix A.   The total numbers 
of juveniles in each category are displayed in Table 2.  
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Table 2 – Number of Offenses by Category 
 
Property Crime/Crime Against State 32     (2.9%) 
Single Person Offense 838   (75.6%) 
Multiple Person Offenses 238   (21.5%) 
 
 
 
c. Past Criminal History (Prior Record of the Juvenile) 
 A juveniles’ past criminal history is captured by the variable “prior record,” 
which is divided into the categories: “no prior record,” “status offenses only,” 
“single misdemeanor only,” “single felony only,” “multiple misdemeanors,” and 
“multiple felonies.”  Due to the small number (21) of youth whose prior records 
consisted of status offenses only, the category “status offenses” includes 
juveniles with only a single status offense, as well as those with multiple status 
offenses.  “Single misdemeanor only” includes youth who had only one prior 
misdemeanor offense, and “single felony only” consists of youth with only one 
prior felony offense.  The category of “multiple misdemeanors” includes juveniles 
with prior records containing multiple charges, the most serious one of which was 
a misdemeanor. In other words, this category includes youth with one or more 
status offenses and a misdemeanor, as well as youth with no status offenses but 
multiple misdemeanor offenses.  “Multiple felonies” includes cases in which youth 
committed multiple types of offenses where the most serious prior charge was a 
felony.  Due to the small sample size, this breakdown was deemed the most 
appropriate to capture both the quantity and severity of a youth’s prior record.  If 
the original charge was pled down or otherwise reduced in some way, the final 
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adjudicated charge is used for analysis since the adjudicated charge becomes 
part of the juvenile’s record.  Charges that were dismissed are not included.  The 
number of cases per prior record category is shown in Table 3.  
 
 
Table 3 – Number of Prior Record Types by Category 
 
No Prior Record 608    (54.9%) 
Status Offenses Only5 21      (1.9%) 
Single Misdemeanor Only 50      (4.5%) 
Single Felony Only 52      (4.7%) 
Multiple Misdemeanors 130    (11.7%) 
Multiple Felonies 247    (22.3%) 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable 
 The dependent variable is waiver status.  This variable has two possible 
values, “waived” and “not waived.”  “Waived” indicates that a youth was 
transferred to Superior Court to be tried as an adult whereas “not waived” 
signifies that the youth remained under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court 
system.  
Method of Analysis 
 Crosstabulation and multivariate contingency table analysis are 
appropriate for this study because of the type and distribution of variables 
(Newton and Rudestam 1999).  The study includes one discretely distributed 
                                                 
5 The North Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (2007) defines 
status offenses as “offenses such as truancy that would not be crimes if committed by a person 
16 years or older.”  
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dependent variable (waiver to Superior Court), a small number of independent 
variables (gender, race, and age), and two control variables (offense seriousness  
and prior criminal history), also discretely distributed.   Relationships between 
variables that have only a small number of categories are revealed in crosstabs 
tables.   Separate tables are presented for each independent variable showing its 
relationship to the dependent variable.  Control variables are then added to the 
initial crosstabulations as a layer variable to test if its initial relationships were 
specious.    
This study examines the complete dataset of all juveniles eligible for 
waiver in North Carolina between 2005 and 2007, rather than a sample.  Due to 
the small size of the dataset and the fact that it represents a complete population 
of youth, rather than a sample, tests of significance, such as Chi-Square were 
not appropriate.  Therefore all differences in categories of variables are actual 
differences rather than inferential.  Some offender groups were of such a small 
size that meaningful discussion of the percentages is not possible; however, the 
actual number of each outcome is noted in the initial analysis. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
 
 
 This study is designed to answer the following questions: Do waivers of 
youth in North Carolina vary by age, race, and gender when controlling for the 
seriousness of the offense and a juvenile’s past criminal history? If so, what 
factors are more operative in waiver decisions?  Based on my review of the 
literature, I hypothesize that when controlling for the legal variables of offense 
seriousness and past criminal history, gender and race will not have a n 
important effect on waiver decisions; however, age will, with older juveniles more 
likely to be waived.  
 
An Overview of Waivers 
 It is relatively unlikely that a youth in North Carolina will be waived. Table 
4 presents the percentages of juveniles waived in each category of the 
independent and control variables.  Only four categories of youth were waived 
more than ten percent of the time: other youth of color (11.1%), youth aged 15 
(10.7%), those who committed multiple person offenses (23.1%), and those with 
a prior record consisting of multiple felonies (15.4%).  Of those categories, the 
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legal variables of offense seriousness, multiple person offenses (23.1%) and 
prior record with multiple felonies (15.4%) revealed a larger percentage of 
waivers than did the demographic variables of race (11.1%) or age (10.7%).  No 
youth were waived for a property crime/crime against the state.   
Demographic Variables - Gender, Race, and Age 
 
Male juveniles were more likely to be waived than female juveniles.  Of the 
total population of 1108 youth, only 101 were female.  The small number of 
females in the juvenile population eligible for waiver was a common element of 
almost all studies in the literature.  Of the 88 juveniles waived, 96.6% were male.  
Although the percentage of females waived (3%) is shown in Table 4, females 
were not included in further analysis. The number of cases is too small to allow 
meaningful discussion of the results.  
White juveniles are the least likely to be waived (4.2%).  Other youth of 
color face the highest risk of waiver, with 11.1% waived.  Black juveniles are 
waived more often than white youth, but not as often as other youth of color.  The 
percent of youth waived who are both black (9.2%) and other youth of color 
(11.1%) is more than twice that of white youth 
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Table 4 – Percentage of Juveniles Waived by Independent Variable 
 
 Not Waived Waived 
Gender   
Male  91.6%    (922)   8.4%    (85)
Female  97.0%      (98)   3.0%      (3)
   
Race   
Black  90.8%    (644)   9.2%    (65)
White  95.8%    (296)   4.2%    (13)
Other Youth Of Color  88.9%      (80) 11.1%    (10)
   
Age   
13  95.9%    (213)   4.1%      (9)
14  94.1%    (317)   5.9%    (20)
15  89.3%    (490) 10.7%    (59)
   
Seriousness of Offense   
Property Crime/Crime 
Against State 100.0%      (32) None
Single Person Offense  96.1%    (805)  3.9%    (33)
Multiple Person Offenses  76.9%    (183) 23.1%    (55)
   
Prior Record   
No Prior Record  94.1%    (572)  5.9%    (36)
Status Offenses Only  95.2%      (20)  4.8%      (1)
Single Misdemeanor Only  94.0%      (47)  6.0%      (3)
Single Felony Only  98.1%      (51)  1.9%      (1)
Multiple Misdemeanors6  93.1%    (121)  6.9%      (9)
Multiple Felonies7  84.6%    (209) 15.4%    (38)
 .   
 
 The percentage of waived youth by age steadily increases with age.  
While just over four percent (4.1%) of youth aged 13 are waived, the percentage 
                                                 
6 This category also may include less serious offenses (status offenses); however, all youth in this 
category have two or more previous adjudications, the most serious one of which was a 
misdemeanor. 
7 This category also may include less serious offenses (status offenses and misdemeanors); 
however, all youth in this category have two or more previous adjudications, the most serious one 
of which was a felony. 
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increases to 5.9% for youth aged 14 and rises to 10.7% for youth aged 15.  Not 
only does the percentage of youth waived increase steadily from age 13 to 15, 
but the absolute numbers of youth eligible also increases with age.  A total of 222 
juveniles age 13 are eligible for waiver; the number of eligible 14 year old 
juveniles is 337, and the number of eligible youth increases to 549 for juveniles 
age 15.  
Legal Variables – Seriousness of Offense and Prior Record 
During the time period covered by this study, no North Carolina youth 
were waived to Superior Court for property crimes/crimes against the state.  Less 
than four percent (3.9%) of youth were waived when charged with a single 
offense against a person; however, the percentage increases to 23.1% for 
juveniles charged with multiple person-related offenses.  The fact that no youth 
were waived for property crimes and the highest percentage of all waiver cases 
were for multiple person crimes does suggest that offense seriousness shapes 
waiver decisions. 
Youth with no prior record (5.9%) were waived more often than youth with 
a prior record consisting only of status offenses (4.8%) or a single felony (1.9%) 
and only slightly less than youth with a single misdemeanor (6.0%).  However, it 
should be noted that the categories of “status offenses,” “single felony only” and 
“single misdemeanor only” are small, and in the case of “status offenses” and 
“single felony only,” only one youth was waived in each category.  Youth having a 
prior record of multiple misdemeanors were somewhat more likely (6.9%) to be 
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waived than youth with no prior record or a record including a single offense. A 
youth with a prior record consisting of multiple felonies was the most likely to be 
waived (15.4%).  When considering each of the independent variables relation to 
waiver, youth with a previous record of “multiple felonies” were the second most 
frequently waived category overall, again suggesting that prior record has an 
impact on waiver decisions in North Carolina.  
 
Relationships Between Dependent and Control Variables on Waivers 
 As previously mentioned, some categories of youth were so small that 
meaningful discussion of the percentages waived was not possible.  Although all 
youth were reported in the descriptive information above, when adding a control 
variable to the crosstabulation, I deleted or combined some of these very small 
categories.  Females were removed from the secondary analysis as there were 
only a total of 101 females in the population.  Eliminating females left a 
population of 1,007 juveniles.  Property crimes/crimes against the state also were 
eliminated as no youth were waived for that category of crime during the study 
period.  When females were removed, only 17 juveniles remained who had a 
prior record consisting of status offenses only.  Since status offenses would not 
even be a crime had they been committed by an adult, they were determined to 
be the least serious type of prior record other than “none.”  Therefore, in the 
secondary analysis, prior records that were status crimes only were combined 
with the category “no prior record.”  Several other categories of prior record had 
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very small counts; however, they remained in the analysis.  These include the 
categories of “single misdemeanor only,” “single felony only,” and “multiple 
misdemeanors.”  Although the counts by race and age for some of these 
categories were small, with some categories having no youth who were waived, it 
was important to maintain these categories.  Misdemeanors and felonies are 
quite different types of crimes, and, I believe, the justice system considers a 
juvenile who has previously committed one misdemeanor as being quite different 
from one who has committed a prior felony.  If the juvenile justice system 
recognizes a meaningful distinction between these categories, it is not 
appropriate to combine them for analysis. 
Waivers by Offense Type  
 When the legal variable of offense type is added to the analysis as a 
control, the patterns of youth waived by race do not change from the initial 
analysis.  White youth remain the least likely to be waived for both a single 
person offense and multiple person offense while other youth of color are the 
most likely to be waived, regardless of whether the offense was a single or 
multiple person offense.  The racial differences are more pronounced for multiple 
person offenses with black juveniles more than twice as likely (25.8%) to be 
waived as white youth (12.0%) and other youth of color more than three times as 
likely (36.8%) as whites (see Table 5).  
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Table 5 – Percentage of Youth (by Race) Waived by Offense Type 
 
 Not Waived Waived 
Single Person Offense   
Black 95.3%   (450)  4.7%   (22)
White 97.3%   (216)  2.7%     (6)
Other Youth of Color 95.1%     (58)  4.9%     (3)
 
Multiple Person Offenses 
Black 74.2%   (118) 25.8%   (41)
White 88.0%     (44) 12.0%     (6)
Other Youth of Color  63.2%      12) 36.8%     (7)
Note that for Table 5 and Table 6, the N is reduced from the original 1108 to 983. This is due to 
removing females from the analysis, as well as males who were charged with property 
crimes/crimes against the state.  
 
 
 
 When controlling for offense type, waiver patterns change slightly when 
examining the age of youth waived (see Table 6).  Initial examination of ages of 
youth waived showed a consistent positive relationship between age and 
likelihood of waiver.  However, when controlling for offense type, a slightly larger 
percentage of youth aged 13 (2.8%) are waived for single person offenses than 
youth aged 14 (2.2%).  It should be noted that the absolute numbers of 13 and 
14 year old youth are very small (4 and 5 respectively) and a change in the 
outcome of one youth would alter the percentages significantly.  Youth aged 15 
remain the most likely to be waived for single person offenses, more than double 
the percentage (5.8%) that of youth aged 13 or 14.   
A consistently positive relationship between age and likelihood of waiver 
for juveniles committing multiple person offenses is shown in Table 6.  Youth 
aged 13 were waived 8.0% of the time, while the chances of waiver more than 
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double for youth aged 14 (20.9%).  Juveniles aged 15 are the most likely to be 
waived (32.4%) with nearly a third of all 15 year olds committing multiple person 
crimes waived.  
 
 
Table 6 – Percentage of Youth (by Age) Waived by Offense Type 
 
 Not Waived Waived 
Single Person Offense   
13  97.2%   (139)  2.8%   (4) 
14  97.8%   (227)  2.2%   (5) 
15  94.2%   (358)  5.8% (22) 
  
Multiple Person Offenses  
13 92.0%     (46)  8.0%    (4) 
14 79.1%     (53) 20.9%  (14) 
15 67.6%     (75) 32.4%  (36) 
 
 
 
Waivers by Prior Record 
 Two patterns emerge when controlling for the legal variable of a juvenile’s 
past criminal history, or prior record (see Table 7).  For juveniles with no prior 
record and those with a past criminal history involving multiple crimes including at 
least one felony, other youth of color are most likely to be waived.  White youth 
are least likely to be waived if they have no prior record (5.3%), followed by black 
youth (6.0%).   For youth in the “multiple felony” category, the trend is the same, 
but the difference in percentages is more pronounced.  White youth are actually 
less likely to be waived for multiple felonies (4.7%) than if they have no prior 
record (5.3%); however, black youth are almost three times more likely to be 
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waived for multiple felonies (17.9%) than if they have no previous offenses 
(6.0%).  One fourth (25.0 %) of other youth of color who previously committed 
multiple felonies are waived, more than double the percent of other youth of color 
waived with no prior record (11.3%), and more than five times the number of 
white youth waived with a prior record of multiple felonies.  
 The second pattern to emerge is that only black youth are waived when 
prior record includes a single crime (either a misdemeanor or felony) or multiple 
misdemeanors.  No white or other youth of color are waived for any of these 
three categories of prior record.  This pattern must be viewed with caution, 
however, as the number of white and other youth of color in these categories is 
very small.  Compared to the 32 black youth with a prior record of a single 
misdemeanor, the population includes only 9 white youth and 4 other youth of 
color.  Of juveniles with a previous single felony charge, 31 are black, 18 white, 
and only 1 is other youth of color.  For multiple misdemeanors, 27 are white 
youth and 9 are other youth of color, compared to 78 black juveniles. 
 These results indicate that other youth of color are more likely to be 
waived for a first offense as well as for multiple felonies than any other racial 
group.  Black juveniles are more likely to be waived than whites or other youth of 
color when they have a prior record consisting of a single offense or multiple 
misdemeanors.  White youth are the least likely to be waived for a first offense or 
multiple felonies, are no more likely than youth of color and less likely than blacks 
to be waived for single offense or multiple misdemeanors.   
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Table 7 – Percentage of Youth (by Race) Waived by Prior Record 
 
 Not Waived Waived 
No prior record   
Black 94.0%   (299) 6.0%  (19)
White 94.7%   (179) 5.3%  (10)
Other Youth of Color 88.7%     (47) 11.3%    (6)
  
Single Misdemeanor Only  
Black 90.6%     (29) 9.4%    (3)
White 100.0%       (9) None
Other Youth of Color 100.0 %      (4) None
  
Single Felony Only  
Black 96.8%     (30) 3.2%    (1)
White 100.0%     (18) None
Other Youth of Color 100.0%       (1) None
  
Multiple Misdemeanors  
Black 89.7%    (70) 10.3%    (8)
White 100.0%    (27) None
Other Youth of Color 100.0%      (9) None
  
Multiple Felonies   
Black 82.1%  (147) 17.9%   (32)
White 95.3%    (41) 4.7%     (2)
Other Youth of Color 75.0%    (12) 25.0%     (4)
Note that for Table 7 and Table 8, the N is reduced from the original 1108 to 1007. This is due to removing 
females from the analysis.  
 
 
 
 Prior criminal history does not change the direction of the relationship 
initially observed between age and waiver.  In all categories of prior record, older 
youth have an increased chance of waiver, as shown in Table 8.  The likelihood 
of waiver increases with each age group for youth with no prior record, from 4.5% 
for youth aged 13, to 6.0% for youth aged 14, to 7.4% for youth aged 15.  The 
percentage waived also increases for each age for a prior record of multiple 
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misdemeanor (from no waivers at age 13 to 11.1% at age 15) as well as multiple 
felonies, which waive 5.7% of youth aged 13, 12.1% of youth aged 14, and 
20.0% of youth aged 15.  No youth age 13 or 14 having a prior record consisting 
of only one misdemeanor or one felony were waived.  Interestingly, youth age 15 
were more than twice as likely to be waived with a prior record of a single 
misdemeanor (10.7%) than with a single felony (4.5%).    
 
 
Table 8 – Percentage of Youth (by Age) Waived by Prior Record 
 
 Not Waived Waived 
No prior record   
13 95.5%   (128) 4.5%    (6)
14 94.0%   (171) 6.0%  (11)
15 92.6%   (226) 7.4%  (18)
 
Single Misdemeanor Only 
13 100.0%       (5) None
14 100.0%     (12) None
15 89.3%     (25) 10.7%   (3)
 
Single Felony Only 
13 100.0%     (13) None
14 100.0%     (15) None
15 95.5%     (21) 4.5%   (1)
 
Multiple Misdemeanors 
13 100.0%     (14) None
14 97.3%     (36) 2.7%   (1)
15 89.9%     (56) 11.1%   (7)
 
Multiple Felonies  
13 94.3%     (33) 5.7%    (2)
14 87.9%     (51) 12.1%    (7)
15 80.0%   (116) 20.0%  (29)
 52
 
Conclusions 
 During 2005, 2006, and 2007, North Carolina’s juvenile justice system did 
not waive large numbers of youth.  Of the total population of 1108 youth, only 
7.9% (88 youth) were waived.  Only three females were waived during the 
period.  The data show that females were less likely to be waived, and, 
consistent with other studies, the total population of females is too small to allow 
any further conclusions regarding the effect of gender on waiver decisions.  
Before controlling for the legal variables of offense seriousness and prior record, 
other youth of color were most likely to be waived, followed by blacks, with white 
youth least likely to be waived.  As age increases so does the likelihood of 
waiver, as older youth have less time remaining under the jurisdiction of the 
juvenile court.  
The results indicate that the seriousness of the offense and a youth’s prior 
record are influential in waiver decisions.  When looking at the relationship of the 
independent and control variables to waiver individually, the highest categories of 
waived youth were those with multiple person offenses and those with a prior 
record of multiple felonies.  The commission of multiple person offenses indicates 
a high degree of severity of the offense, and a prior record of multiple felonies 
suggests that the juvenile was not responsive to previous attempts at 
rehabilitation by the juvenile system.  No youth were waived for property 
crimes/crimes against the state, the least severe category of offense type. 
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Other youth of color are most likely to be waived before the introduction of 
control variables and remain the most likely racial category to be waived when 
controlling for offense seriousness.  They also are most likely to be waived when 
they have no prior record or a prior record of multiple felonies.  White juveniles 
are the least likely to be waived overall, for a first offense or for a previous record 
of multiple felonies.  The likelihood that a black youth will be waived overall and 
when controlling for offense seriousness is greater than whites, but less than 
other youth of color.  Black youth are most likely to be waived when the prior 
record includes one previous crime or multiple misdemeanors. In fact, black 
youth were the only youth waived in those categories during this study.  
Although not a consistently positive relationship across all categories, 
when controlling for legal variables generally, as age increases, so does a 
juvenile’s chance of waiver.  For each category of offense seriousness and prior 
record, youth age 15 were always the most likely to be waived.  Committing a 
single person offense was the only situation where youth aged 13 had a greater 
likelihood of waiver than those aged 14.  For prior records consisting of a single 
crime (misdemeanor or felony), all youth waived were age 15.  
Although the actual percentages of waivers by race and age change when 
legal variables are inserted as controls, the categories of youth most likely and 
least likely to be waived do not.  This suggests that the legal variables of offense 
seriousness and prior record are the most operative in waiver decisions in North 
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Carolina; however, race and age also are predictive of which youth have a 
greater chance of being waived.  
 
CHAPTER VII 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
The ability to waive some youth to Superior Court allows the juvenile 
justice system to preserve its rehabilitative focus by providing a mechanism for 
removing youth who have committed particularly violent or calculated offenses, 
or who have failed to respond to previous attempts at treatment.  An overall 
waiver rate of less than eight percent suggests that North Carolina adheres to the 
intent of waiver, using it selectively for those youth who are not perceived as 
amenable to treatment options within the juvenile justice system.  Waiver 
decisions must involve a certain amount of discretion, as the specific factors in 
each case must be taken into account in determining the most appropriate 
means of responding to an individual youth’s offense(s).   As with any 
discretionary policy, unintentionally discriminatory treatment of certain groups 
may result.   
The body of research on waiver decisions consistently finds that 
seriousness of offense, prior record, and age are the strongest predictors of 
waiver.  Seriousness of offense and prior record are both legal factors in a waiver 
hearing; therefore, it is logical they would have a significant impact on waiver 
decisions.  If the juvenile system did not incorporate waiver as a “safety valve,” 
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public faith in the entire juvenile system would be jeopardized when juveniles 
who repeatedly committed serious and violent offenses were treated with more 
leniency and were released back into society for no other reason than reaching a 
particular age.  In some respects, age becomes a quasi-legal variable, as the 
maximum age the North Carolina juvenile system has jurisdiction over the most 
severe offender is 21.  If the juvenile’s crime was clearly premeditated and 
violent, judges may be reluctant to allow even a first time offender to remain in 
the juvenile system because of the short amount of time available for treatment 
before the offender “ages out” and has to be released.  
The effects of race on a juvenile’s likelihood of waiver are more difficult to 
isolate.  Although other youth of color have the highest likelihood of being waived 
(11.1%), they are only 11.3% of the total population of waived youth.  An 
examination of the total population of waived youth in North Carolina shows them 
to be predominately male (96.6%), black (73.9%), and age 15 (67.0%).  Because 
a larger number of black youth (709) are eligible for waiver, black youth represent 
the largest category of youth actually waived despite the fact that the percent of 
black youth actually waived is less than for other youth of color.  These data 
prompt two distinct questions: why are youth of color the most likely to be waived 
and why are larger numbers of black youth eligible for waiver? 
Black’s theoretical assumption that law does not operate in a social 
vacuum and that the social characteristics of all parties involved influence legal 
outcomes offers possible explanations for both questions.  By conceptualizing 
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law and the legal system as variable means of social control operating within the 
larger society, Black’s theory offers insight into the social forces that impact all 
aspects of juvenile justice from the initial commission of deviant behavior until the 
point of a waiver decision.  Individuals who are lower on the social strata are at 
risk of being subjected to a higher quantity of law.  If the racial groups included in 
other youth of color are drawn from lower social classes than the black or white 
youth, this could explain why a higher percentage of these youth are waived. Or, 
this could be explained as sheer discrimination against other youth of color 
moreso than against black or white youth. However, both of these explanations 
are speculative at this point. Given that this study does not include measures of 
social status, outside of race, the actual impact of social class cannot be 
assessed. The same can be said for evidence of discrimination. Variation does 
not necessarily mean discrimination. Thus, evaluation of additional evidence 
would be necessary before a claim of discrimination could be supported.  
 The literature offers some insight into why a higher number of black youth 
are eligible for waiver to begin with.  Social characteristics affect each decision 
along the continuum of the juvenile justice process, not just at the point of waiver.  
The decisions made throughout the juvenile justice process affect the youth 
eventually eligible for waiver.  According to the literature, African American 
juveniles are arrested and charged more often for different types of offenses than 
white youth (Podkopacz and Feld 1995).  Police are more likely to focus their 
attention on lower class minority neighborhoods, putting certain youth at higher 
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risk of arrest (Jordan 2005).  Bishop and Frazier (1996) also find that many well-
intended juvenile justice policies are inadvertently discriminatory as they do not 
allow equal opportunities for economically disadvantaged youth, many of whom 
are African American.   
Although social factors may affect other youth of color and black youth 
differently within the juvenile justice system, any differences between these two 
groups and risk of waiver are relatively small compared to the overall difference 
between the risk of waiver for these two groups as compared to whites. Thus, the 
more important story here is that all youth of color (black youth and those in the 
other youth of color category) are more than twice as likely to be waived than  
white youth.  When black and other youth of color are combined into a single 
category, “youth of color,” the differential outcomes for all youth of color become 
clear when examining absolute numbers of youth eligible for waiver, absolute 
numbers of youth actually waived, and likelihood of waiver (percent waived) (see 
Table 9).   Even after controlling for the legal variables of offense seriousness 
and prior record, the percent of all youth of color waived is notably higher than for 
white youth. All youth of color are overrepresented in the population of waived 
youth.  For multiple person offenses, the percent waived for youth of color 
(27.0%) is more than twice that of white youth (12.0%), and for a prior record 
consisting of multiple felonies, youth of color are nearly four times as likely to be 
waived (18.5%) as white youth (4.7%). 
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Table 9 – Percentage of Youth of Color and White Youth Waived  
 
 Not Waived Waived 
Race   
Youth of Color 89.9% (648) 10.1% (73)
White 95.8% (274) 4.2% (12)
 
Seriousness of Current Offense  
Single Person Offenses 
Youth of Color 95.3% (508) 4.7% (25)
White 97.3% (216) 2.7%   (6)
 
Multiple Person Offenses 
Youth of Color 73.0% (130) 27.0% (48)
White 88.0%   (12) 12.0 %  (6)
 
Prior Record 
No prior record 
Youth of Color 93.3% (346) 6.7%  (25)
White 94.7% (179) 5.3%  (10)
 
Single Misdemeanor Only 
Youth of Color 91.7% (33) 8.3%   (3)
White 100.0%   (9) None
 
Single Felony Only 
Youth of Color 96.9% (31) 3.1%   (1)
White 100.0% (18) None
 
Multiple Misdemeanors 
Youth of Color 90.8% (79) 9.2%   (8)
White 100.0% (27) None
 
Multiple Felonies 
Youth of Color 81.5% (159) 18.5% (36)
White 95.3%   (41) 4.7%   (2)
 
 
 
Contrary to most of the literature, even when controlling for legal variables, 
this study indicates that race influences the likelihood of waiver in North Carolina.  
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From the data available and the analytical techniques used in this study, it is not 
possible to offer definitive conclusions regarding the effect of race; however, 
some informed speculations may offer some guidance for further research in 
North Carolina. 
It is possible that more youth of color are waived as a result of 
discrimination, either unintentional or intentional.  Because the juvenile system is 
designed to be more responsive to the needs of individual youth than the adult 
justice system, it includes more discretionary policies at all stages of the system.  
Discretionary decision-making may result in inadvertent discrimination against 
some types of youth.  Alternatively, the same discretionary policies may be used 
as a way to explain away differential outcomes when in reality blatant 
discrimination was a determining factor in decision-making.  It is not possible to 
determine from endpoint data alone if racial discrimination has occurred, nor if it 
was unintentional or deliberate.  
Another possible reason for finding race to be predictive of waivers in this 
study may be a regional effect.  Other studies reviewed did not conduct research 
in the southeastern United States, where race may have a unique effect.  In 
particular in the southeastern United States, race may be linked to social class.  
Although this study did not examine any data indicative of social class, it is 
possible that this variation by race is as much a class effect as a race effect; 
however, this is purely speculative.  Finally, it is possible that within the state of 
North Carolina, regional variations affected the outcomes.  North Carolina has 
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several large urban areas; however, the far eastern and western parts of the 
state are very rural.  The norms and values of communities influence the local 
response to crime.  Rural counties may be likely to respond differently to 
offenders than large urban areas.  The racial makeup of the state also varies 
geographically.  For example, the far western part of the state is rural with a very 
small African American population; however, a Native American reservation is 
located in western NC.  The eastern part of the state also is rural, but with a 
much larger African-American population.  Certain groups of youth of color may 
be viewed differently in the far western and far eastern parts of the state 
depending on their prevalence in the local population.  In addition, urban 
communities may treat youth of color differently than rural counties.  Again, this is 
purely speculative. 
Patterns of offending also may contribute to the appearance of a race 
effect in North Carolina.  Studies that did find some race effect (Barnes and 
Franz 1989) suggest that this effect may have been correlated with offense type.  
Because of the number of different offenses levied against the juveniles in this 
population, the offenses were combined into a small number of categories to 
ensure enough data in each category for analysis.  For example, voluntary 
manslaughter and first degree child rape are in the same category of “crimes 
against persons.”  However, these two crimes may be viewed quite differently by 
judges determining waiver. If offense type varies by race, the effect of offense 
 62
 
type may have been masked by the way in which that category was constructed 
for the purposes of this particular study.  
 
Limitations of the Study and Opportunities for Future Research 
While this study was able to support the hypothesis of a positive 
correlation between age and waiver, it did not support the hypothesis that the 
effect of race is eliminated when controlling for legal variables of offense 
seriousness and prior record.  Due to the small sample, I was unable to draw 
meaningful conclusions regarding gender.  More advanced statistical techniques 
could possibly examine the relationships between these variables in more detail.  
For example, initially it seems odd that white youth would be more likely to be 
waived when they had no prior record than when they had a prior record of 
multiple felonies.  If more layers of analysis were possible, this finding could be 
discussed further.  In addition, because an entire population, rather than a 
sample, was studied, I did not conduct significance tests.  
A larger population also would allow for more analysis, perhaps showing 
clearer relationships.  As previously mentioned, due to the small number of 
females overall, they were eliminated from the secondary analysis.  All crimes 
against persons also were collapsed into a single category.  Judges facing 
waiver decisions may consider some of the crimes in this category to be legally 
different than others.  More data would allow these offense type categories to be 
further analyzed. Another example of the small dataset affecting categories 
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available for analysis can be seen with the category of offense seriousness 
labeled “multiple person offenses.”  This category includes juveniles charged with 
as few as two and as many as eleven person offenses.  It is likely that a judge 
does not consider the juvenile with two person offenses in the same manner as 
one committing eleven.  However, subdividing this category any further would 
have made the number of cases in each category too small for significant 
observations.  Similar concerns emerged with the “multiple misdemeanor” and 
“multiple felonies” categories.  If the North Carolina Department of Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention maintains the current data collection system 
for years to come, more in-depth analysis may be conducted to expand on these 
findings and draw more definitive conclusions as the population available for 
analysis increases. 
Access to victim data, as well as more socio-economic data regarding the 
offender, would allow for much more depth of analysis.  Using Blacks’ theory as a 
guide, analysis of offender information only is not as meaningful as when the 
relationship of the offender and victim are considered together (Black 1989).  
Basic demographic information regarding the victim and more in-depth 
information regarding the offender (such as his/her household composition and 
educational status) would allow for more detailed analysis using Black’s theory 
as a guiding framework. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
In this study, I sought to determine if waivers to Superior Court in North 
Carolina vary by gender, race, and age when controlling for the legal variables of 
offense seriousness and a juvenile’s prior record.  North Carolina law allows 
youth as young as 13 to be waived to Superior Court, and once convicted they 
will be treated as an adult for all future criminal proceedings regardless of their 
age.  The process of transferring a juvenile to Superior Court and trying and 
sentencing him/her as an adult has serious negative consequences for the future 
life chances of the juvenile; therefore, it is important to have an accurate 
awareness of the factors that are most operative in waiver decisions. 
A review of the literature established that while nearly all populations of 
waived youth are disproportionately older, male and youth of color, this alone 
does not indicate that waiver is implemented in a discriminatory manner.  The 
body of research consistently finds age, seriousness of offense, and prior record 
of the juvenile to be the strongest predictors of waiver; however, the research is 
not consistent when examining the effects of race and gender.  In order to 
determine if waivers in North Carolina vary by gender, race, and age, I examined 
the total population of waived youth between 2005 and 2007.
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I found that male juveniles of color (other than African-American) aged 15 
were most likely to be waived when waivers were examined solely by 
demographic categories.  Overall, the results did not change when the legal 
variables of offense seriousness and prior record were added to the analysis.  In 
some categories of prior record, black youth were more likely to be waived than 
other youth of color; however, the total population in these categories is of such a 
small size that results must be interpreted with caution.  The combined category 
of “all youth of color” proved to be the most central in understanding the role of 
race in waiver decisions as youth of color are more than twice as likely than white 
youth to be waived across all categories of the legal variable controls.  Youth 
aged 15 always were the most likely to be waived.  Males were more likely to be 
waived as well; however, the population of females was so small that they were 
excluded from secondary analysis.  The largest percentages of waived youth 
were those who committed the most serious crimes and had a prior record of 
multiple crimes including at least one felony.  A juvenile’s chance of waiver was 
higher when considering the legal variables than demographic variables.  These 
results indicate that the legal variables of offense seriousness and prior record 
are the strongest predictors of waiver in North Carolina; however, the juvenile’s 
age and race also affect his/her chances of being waived to Superior Court.  I 
therefore supported my hypothesis with regards to the positive relationship 
between age and waiver, but did not support my hypothesis that race would not 
have an effect with the introduction of legal variables as controls. 
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Although initially it is encouraging that the legal variables of offense 
seriousness and prior record are most operative in waiver decisions, followed by 
the quasi-legal variable of age, with a juvenile’s race being the least predictive of 
the four variables, the effect of race on waiver in North Carolina is difficult to 
isolate.  Other youth of color have the highest percentage of youth waived; 
however, black youth make up the highest numbers of youth actually waived.   It 
is not possible in this limited study to determine the reasons for the different 
outcomes for the two racial groups, although social forces may have a more 
pronounced negative impact on black youth during decisions prior to the waiver 
decision, but affect other youth of color primarily at the point of the waiver 
decision.  Either way, all youth of color are at a disadvantage relative to white 
youth in waiver decisions.  Although the data are not available in this study to 
support these speculations, it is possible that the differential waiver rates could 
be due to discrimination, geographical effects, patterns of offending, or some 
combination of the above.   
This research is limited for several reasons, each of which provides an 
opportunity for future expansion of this study.  Victim information was not 
available in the dataset provided and would require a more in-depth research 
protocol.  However, access to victim characteristics, as well as additional social 
characteristics of the offenders, would allow further analysis within the framework 
of Black’s theoretical perspective.  In addition, the small population of youth, 
particularly that of females, prevented meaningful discussion of some categories 
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of offenders.  As North Carolina continues to collect information regarding 
juvenile offenders and the population grows, more opportunities for advanced 
analysis will present themselves.  More sophisticated analytical techniques also 
may be used to illustrate more complex relationships between variables.  
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Appendix A 
 
Listing of Original Offenses 
(as charged by NC Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention) 
 
Re-coded category Original Offense 
 
Assault Law Enforcement office/Parole Officer/Other 
with a Firearm 
Assault with a Deadly Weapon Inflicting Serious 
Injury 
Assault with a Deadly Weapon with intent to Kill 
Assault with a Deadly Weapon with intent to Kill 
Inflicting Serious Injury 
Discharge weapon occupied property 
Discharge weapon occupied property in operation 
inflicting serious bodily injury 
First degree burglary8 
First degree kidnapping 
First degree rape 
First degree rape child 
First degree sex offense child 
First degree sexual exploitation of a minor 
First degree sexual offense 
Incest where the victim is < 13 years of age and the 
perpetrator is >= 4 years older than the victim 
Malicious assault in secret 
Robbery with a dangerous weapon 
Crimes against Persons 
Second degree kidnapping 
 
                                                 
8 First degree burglary is categorized as a Crime against a Person based on the legal definition of 
the crime. According to NC Statute G.S. 14-51 the crime of burglary is in the first degree when 
the dwelling is occupied at the time of the burglary.  Because there were persons inside the 
dwelling during the commission of the crime, I decided to include First Degree Burglary in the 
Crimes against Person section. NC Statute G.S. 14-51 defines second degree burglary as 
burglary of a dwelling that was not occupied at the time of the crime. If there had been any 
juveniles in this population charged with second degree burglary, that crime would have been 
categorized as a Property Crime/Crime Against the State. 
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Re-coded category Original Offense 
 
Crimes against Persons Second degree murder 
Second degree rape 
Second degree sexual offense 
Statutory Rape/ Sex Offense Defendant > 4 - < 6 
Years 
Statutory Rape/ Sex Offense Defendant > = 6 Years 
Voluntary Manslaughter 
 
 
Property Crimes/Crimes 
Against the State 
Adulterated or misbranded food 
Breaking out of dwelling/house burglary 
Burn church/religious building 
Distribution of certain food at Halloween and all other 
times prohibited – any poisonous chemical or 
compound or any foreign substance which might 
cause death, serious physical injury or serious 
physical pain and discomfort 
First degree arson 
Manufacture/sell/deliver/possess controlled 
substance at child care center 
Obtain or attempt to obtain property false pretenses 
>= $100,000 
Possess with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver 
controlled substance on or near a playground 
Promote drug sales by a minor 
Sell/deliver controlled substance within 300 ft. of 
school 
 
Trafficking in Cocaine >= 400 grams 
 
 
   
 
